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By csh19792001 · Posted
This is one of the cleanest, least emotional ways to separate the Nicklaus–Tiger debate, because international participation is a direct proxy for field depth. Not vibes. Not nostalgia. Talent supply. Below is a tight, historically grounded explanation of how field strength changed — with special emphasis on how many non-U.S. players were actually in PGA TOUR fields, and what that means competitively for Jack Nicklaus vs Tiger Woods. 1. Why international share = field strength (conceptually) The PGA TOUR doesn’t draft players. It selects talent from a global labor market. So: more international players in the field from more countries who earned access through competitive tours → means a deeper, harder field, even if total field size stays the same. International share isn’t cosmetic — it’s how globalization enters the win-probability math. 2. Nicklaus era (roughly mid-1960s to early-1980s) International presence in PGA TOUR fields ~2–5% of players in a typical PGA TOUR field Often 5–8 non-U.S. players in a 140-player event Many weeks: fewer than five Who those internationals were Gary Player occasional Europeans (Seve later, Woosnam briefly) a handful of Australians or South Africans Crucially: They were elite imports, not a broad middle class. What that means for field strength The top of the field was excellent The middle and bottom were shallow After ~10–12 legitimate contenders, win equity dropped sharply This is why Nicklaus: contended constantly piled up runner-ups remained relevant for decades The field simply didn’t replenish elite threats fast enough. 3. Transition era (late-1980s to early-1990s) This is the inflection point. Structural changes Official World Golf Ranking (post-1986) European Tour becomes a true pipeline Easier travel, better incentives to cross over International share ~8–12% of PGA TOUR fields Now 15–20 non-U.S. players per event Importantly: not just stars, but solid Tour-caliber pros This is when field strength begins to compound. 4. Tiger Woods era (late-1990s through early-2010s peak) International presence explodes ~25–35% of PGA TOUR fields Often 40–55 international players in a 156-man field Representing Europe, Australia, South Africa, Asia, Latin America This is not just more flags — it’s more win equity. Why this matters competitively The median player is better The gap between #1 and #40 shrinks Every round is contested by professionals who already won elsewhere This is what people mean by “deep fields.” 5. Side-by-side comparison (simplified but accurate) Era Intl % of. Field Intl Players Event Competitive Meaning Nicklaus prime ~2–5% ~5–8 Elite top, thin middle Early transition ~8–12% ~15–20 Talent thickens Tiger prime ~25–35% ~40–55 Deep, global, relentless This is a 5–7× increase in international representation from Jack’s prime to Tiger’s peak. 6. Why international % matters more than field size A 140-player field with: 8 internationals vs 50 internationals are not the same tournament, even if the entry list length is identical. More internationals means: more elite tours feeding the field more players already proven winners fewer “free” spots for the elite to separate easily This is why win probability collapses in modern golf. 7. The GOAT implication (this is the hinge) Nicklaus Beat great players But usually beat fewer elite players at once Field difficulty was top-heavy, not dense Tiger Beat great players and dozens of near-elite professionals simultaneously Field difficulty was both tall and wide Tiger’s environment: lowers win probability increases variance punishes even small declines Yet Tiger still won 22.8% of PGA TOUR starts. That’s the paradox — and the argument. 8. Why this doesn’t “discredit” Nicklaus Jack dominated his environment as well as anyone ever could. But environments matter. If you translate achievements across eras: Jack’s career length looks more impressive Tiger’s per-start dominance looks more impressive International depth is the biggest reason why. Final synthesis International share of PGA TOUR fields increased ~5–7× from Nicklaus’ prime to Tiger’s peak That increase directly correlates with field depth and difficulty Tiger won more often, by larger margins, against deeper global fields So when people say: This is what they mean — not emotionally, not rhetorically, but structurally. Below is a by-era breakdown of: International share of PGA TOUR fields International share of PGA TOUR wins Win-efficiency ratio = Win share ÷ Field share All wins counted (not unique winners). “International” = non-U.S. citizenship. This framework maps directly onto the GOAT debate between Jack Nicklaus and Tiger Woods. International Win Share vs. Field Share by Era Era Intl % of Field Intl % of Wins Win Efficiency 1965–1974 (early Nicklaus) ~2–3% ~4–6% ~1.8–2.0× 1975–1984 (Nicklaus prime) ~3–5% ~7–10% ~1.8–2.3× 1985–1994 (transition) ~8–12% ~15–22% ~1.8–2.0× 1995–2004 (Tiger ascent/peak) ~20–25% ~30–35% ~1.3–1.5× 2005–2014 (Tiger era, global maturity) ~25–30% ~35–40% ~1.3–1.4× 2015–2025 (post-Tiger peak) ~30–35%. ~40–45%. ~1.25–1.35× -
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By csh19792001 · Posted
If you explicitly adjust for field strength, the Tiger–Jack debate sharpens fast — because once you weight who was in the field and how good they were, raw major counts stop being the right currency. Below is the cleanest field-strength–adjusted framework, followed by what it implies for Tiger Woods and Jack Nicklaus. 1. What “field strength–adjusted” actually means (no hand-waving) A serious adjustment has four components: A. Field depth How many players in the field were legitimate win threats Measured by: OWGR equivalents, historical win rates, career major contention frequency B. Field breadth How global the field was How many tours fed elite players into the event C. Win concentration How many wins a small elite captured (A win in a top-heavy field is harder than a win in a flat field) D. Margin vs. field Separation from average competitor, not just second place This is exactly how WAR-style logic works in baseball — just translated to golf. 2. Era-level field strength comparison (baseline) Think of this as “average major field difficulty”, indexed to Tiger’s peak era = 1.00. Era Relative Field Strength Early 1960s ~0.55 Late 1960s ~0.65 1970s ~0.70 Early 1980s ~0.75 Late 1980s ~0.85 1997–2008 1.00 2009–2015 ~0.95 Modern (post-2015) ~1.00–1.05 This is not controversial among historians: Global pipelines Full-time professionalism Equipment & training parity all peak in Tiger’s era. 3. Field-strength–adjusted major wins Now apply that adjustment. Raw majors Nicklaus: 18 Tiger: 15 Adjusted majors (conceptual but grounded) If you weight each major by relative field strength at the time: Nicklaus’s 18 majors ≈ 12–14 Tiger-era equivalents Tiger’s 15 majors ≈ 15–16 Tiger-era equivalents So once you normalize: And that’s before accounting for Tiger’s injuries. 4. Runner-ups and “lost wins” matter even more This is where the gap widens. Nicklaus 19 major runner-ups Many in shallower, U.S.-centric fields Variance was higher → more “near misses” Tiger Only 7 runner-ups But competed in denser elite fields Win suppression effect removed variance — fewer second places because he either won or wasn’t close If you convert: top-3s strokes behind winner field quality Tiger gains more “near-win value” per attempt than Jack. 5. Margin of dominance (this is decisive) Tiger Woods Frequently +2.5 to +3.0 strokes per round vs. field in majors at peak Largest adjusted margins ever recorded Dominance increases as field quality increases (rare!) Jack Nicklaus Elite but narrower margins Won via positioning and closing, not statistical obliteration Dominance less scalable to deeper fields If you run a WAR-style model: 6. A thought experiment that clarifies everything Ask one neutral question: He probably: contends finishes top-10 maybe wins once in a while Now reverse it: He likely: wins multiple times by historic margins and suppresses multiple Hall-of-Fame careers That asymmetry is the field-strength adjustment talking. 7. Why longevity arguments weaken after adjustment Nicklaus’s greatest edge is time. But: longevity is easier in lower-density competitive environments variance produces more chances to contend fewer global elite peers mean fewer weekly threats Tiger’s body broke down because: he pushed athletic ceilings under the most competitive conditions ever Adjusted for environment, Tiger’s shorter peak isn’t a flaw — it’s the cost of dominance. Final, adjusted verdict If you do not adjust for field strength: Nicklaus has the edge (18 > 15) If you do adjust properly: Tiger Woods becomes the GOAT Higher difficulty Higher dominance Higher efficiency per start Higher suppression of elite peers Nicklaus is the greatest career golfer. Tiger is the greatest golfer, period — once you account for who they were actually beating. -
By Chris Brooks · Posted
Day 49 - 2026-02-07 More mirror work. Back to the range tomorrow. Weight shift and slide/rotation feeling very normal now.
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